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Antonio Gramsci
Antonio Gramsci is a name practically unknown in America,
yet he is one of the leading thinkers of the last half-century. An
Italian Marxist, he died in Mussolini's jails in 1937. When he
was arrested in 1926 he was 35 years old, married, with one child
and another on the way whom he never saw. At the time Gramsci
was a Deputy to the Chamber (a Congressman) and secretary of
the Communist Party of Italy.
After being moved from jail to jail he was finally transferred to
a penitentiary in Bari in July, 1928. For the next six years, until
his health completely broke down, Gramsci studied and wrote,
filling thirty-two notebooks with notes, observations, and essays.
He wrote over a million words, which made up six volumes when
they were published between 1947 and 1954. States a recent
Italian encyclopedia: "The thirty~two ~otebooks written in prison
constitute a very important document of Italian culture..•. His
letters from prison are outstanding as an expression of humanity
as well as culture."
Gramsci is a Marxist of the caliber of the early Kautsky, and
he compares favorably with Plekhanov and Rosa Luxemburg.
He is a Marxist in the great tradition of Marx himself, a thinker
with an open mind, disciplined in the search for truth. The
daily newspaper Ordine Nuovo J which he edited, carried on its
masthead the motto "To Tell the Truth Is Revolutionary." Today, when Marxists throughout the world know the consequences
of a lack of probity and sobriety in theory and practice, Gramsci's
austere words are fresh and invigorating:
"We must not conceive of a scientific discussion as if it
were a courtroom proceeding in which there are a defendant
and a prosecutor who, by duty of his office, must show the defendant guilty. It is a premise in scientific discussion that the
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interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement of
science. Therefore the most 'advanced' thinker is he who understands that his adversary may express a truth which should
be incorporated in his own ideas, even if in a minor way. To
understand and evaluate realistically the position and reasons
of one's adversary (and sometimes the adversary is the entire
thought of the past) means to have freed oneself from the
prison of ideologies, in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has
then arrived at a critical frame of mind, the only fruitful stancein scientific research."
To speak of Gramsci as a Marxist with an open mind may
strike many people as a contradiction in terms, because the behavior of a considerable number of Marxists has bolstered ruling
class propaganda that Marxism is a dogma. Marxism is not a
dogma though there are Marxists who are dogmatists, just as
science is not dogma though there are scientists who are dogmatists. Marx himself made this point when he averred that he
was no "Marxist."
The deeper one's Marxism the less one's dogmatism. But a prerequisite for deepening one's knowledge of Marxism is to take
Marxism seriously. This is the foundation of Gramsci's thought,
as it was Lenin's. Marxism is a world view, the modern world
view, the greatest the human mind has so far created. World
view is a term Gramsci uses constantly. He means by it a system
of philosophy so embracing as to cover all of human experience,
knowledge, and activity: art, science, politics, economics, sociology, psychiatry-everything. Christianity, for example, is a
world view.
Gramsci never wearies of the assertion that Marxism is an independent philosophy; it does not need to be blended with
Freud, Jesus, logical positivism, or what have you. It is autonomous, original, capable of inner self.development. Gramsci rebukes a writer on the left in Italy who wrote that Marx. was one of
a series of great scientists. Not at all, says Gramsci, u • • • none of
the other scientists produced an integrated world view. Marx.
intellectually originates a historical era which will probably
last for centuries, that is, until the disappearance of a political
6

society and the advent of a self-administering society." In a
charming footnote he goes on to point out that the left-wing
author is less clear-sighted than the Catholic "Monsignor Olgiatti,
who in his little volume on Marx finds that the only parallel to
Marx is Jesus. For a prelate this parallel is quite a concession,
since he believes Jesus was divine."
What most interest and excite Gramsci are the problems connected with the development of a workers' state. He writes:
"From the moment when the oppressed class comes to power
creating a new type of state the necessity arises to construct
concretely a new moral and intellectual order, that is to say,
a new type of society. This entails the development of more
universal concepts, of more subtle and decisive ideological
weapons... :'
And again:
"In the phase of struggle before taking power the science
of politics is primarily developed; in the phase of state power
all the superstructure must be developed, or the state itself
may disintegrate." [Italics added.-Ed.]
Gramsci is the analyst of the superstructure, par excellence. In
area after area-sociology, politics, mass psychology, literature,
etc.-he deepened Marxism, sometimes going further than Lenin,
for in many areas Lenin acted as a Marxist but did not write
and develop the lessons of his experiences. It is no accident that
Togliatti and the Italian Communists have shown such political
skill, for the legacy of Gramsci is alive among them. Togliatti was
'Co-editor with Gramsci on the Ordine Nuovo, and many of the
older Italian Communists learned their Marxism in the political
struggles led by Gramsci in the 1920'S.
Gramsci is concerned with the problems of transition from the
old society to the new, the problems after socialist state power
is established: the role of intellectuals in such a state, the dilemmas of freedom versus security, all the problems which are today
so much to the fore. That is why Gramsci sounds so contemporary; that is why his writings are so important. His insights are
bright weapons in the arsenal of progressive mankind as it fights
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for man's very existence in the most titanic struggle in the history
of the species; as it fights against the dark, sanguinary past embodied in the present, including some somber reflections in the
socialist states themselves.
Gramsci's writings are now being translated. There is a profound poetic justice that this Communist intellectual whose
voice fascism stifled, physically destroying him in the process,
should be heard today at this juncture in history when his insights are most needed and, most important, when his wisdom
can be heeded.
Take the problem of freedom of science and art in a transition
society which is not stable and where the old ideologies are
powerful and operative throughout the population. This is one
of the basic problems of contemporary socialist states. Gramsci
argues that in a transition state, where the society is not stable,
there is the problem of "setting limits on freedom of discussion and
propaganda" and he asks who will set these limits, and in fact
can "these limits be determined at all"? His answer is unequivocal:
"I think not. It seems to me that of necessity the search for
new truths ... must be left to the free initiative of the individual scientists-even if scientists continually re-examine
those very premises which seem most essential, fundamental,
and settled once and for all."
(As a political leader Gramsci is aware of the problems which
freedom creates for a transitional government and he suggests that
while the scientist must be free the results of his inquiry may be
subject to examination before being made public.
Gramsci sharpens the theoretical tools of the working class,
fighting against the vulgarization of Marxism, particularly its
reduction to mechanistic determinism. He can understand its
appeal and even usefulness before the assumption of state power,
when ". . . the class struggle seems to be a series of defeats for
the working class. Mechanistic determinism is then a formidable
morale builder, making for cohesion, perseverance, patience, and
8

stubbornness. The worker says to himself 'I have been defeated for
the moment but the logic of history works for me in the long run,
etc.' What seems to be an act of individual will is actually an act
of faith, a travesty.... But when the oppressed class becomes the
ruling class, responsible for the economic activity of the masses,
then mechanistic determinism becomes a clear and present
danger...."
It is therefore time, says Gramsci, to "render a funeral elegy
to determinism, burying it with full honors."
In area after area he shows concretely the distinction between
vulgar determinism and Marxism. Read Politics and Ideology,
which he begins:
"We must fight theoretically as primitive infantilism the
attempt to explain every fluctuation of politics and ideology as
an immediate reflection of some change in the economic base
of the structure."
He goes on to point out in a brilliant passage that the contrary
may be true, that
" ... any specific political act may have been an error on the
part of the administrators of the ruling classes, an error which
historical development rectifies through the parliamentary
'crisis' in the governments of the ruling classes. Mechanical
historical materialism does not consider the possibility of error
but assumes that every political act is determined by the economic base of society.... " (Italics added-Ed.)
To one of Gramsci's acute awareness of the importance of the
superstructure in society the significance of art could not be minimized. Literature and the theater, painting, music, all engaged
his serious attention. Marx's proud motto from Terence, "Nothing human is alien to me," applies equally to Gramsci. At the very
time of the sharpest political struggles with rising fascism, of
exhausting party activities, when he was busy with reports and
analyses for the movement, busy with editorial responsibilities,
writing political and polemical articles, he still found time for the
theater and for literature. In some' two years he wrote over 150
reviews for the party paper.
9
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In jail the breadth of his interests continues. A single example
is here quoted at length to give a flavor of his penetrating criticism.
He sees a magazine article on Sinclair Lewis' Babbitt and he puts
pen to paper:
"It would be interesting to analyze the reasons for the great
European success of Babbitt. It is not a great book; it is constructed too schematically and the mechanism shows. Its importance seems more cultural than artistic; the critique of mores
prevails over art. The existence of a literary current of realism
in America which begins to be critical of its mores is a cultural
fact of great importance: it means that self-criticism is widening, that a new American civilization is being born, conscious
of its strengths and its weaknesses.
"The European intellectuals have already lost this function
to a large extent: they no longer represent cultural self-criticism, the self-criticism of the ruling class. They have either
become direct agents of the ruling class or have separated into
a little caste with no national roots. They laugh at Babbitt) his
mediocrity, his naive stupidity, his standardized mentality.
They don't even think of the question: do Babbitts exist in
Europe? The fact is that the standardized petty bourgeois does
exist in Europe, but on a regional and local scale, rather than
on a national scale. The European Babbitts are historically inferior to the American Babbitt; they are a national weakness
whereas the American Babbitt is a national strength.
" . . . Babbitt is a philistine in a country in motion; the
European petty bourgeoisie are philistines in conservative
countries, rotting away in the swamps of a parochialism which
preens itself as a great culture. . .. The plain fact is that no
European writer has been able to present the European Bah
bitt. The European writer is no longer capable of self-criticism
and therefore he is an imbecile and a philistine-only he
doesn't know it."
It should be remembered that this was written twenty-five
years ago. In the last few years leading American writers have
been shying away from critical appraisal of American mores. If
the drift sh~uld continue Gramsci's scathing criticism will apply
to our writers.
This critique of Babbitt shows a remarkable knowledge of
American society. Gramsci is very interested in the United States,
IO

as the strongest capitalist power, but he is interested in all aspects
of it. His writings are peppered with jottings on our country,
though they are of unequal weight. Here are two samples:

"On American delinquency. It is usual to explain the growth
of organized delinquency in the United States by reference to
Prohibition and smuggling.... This is true. But another im·
portant factor should be sought in the incredible brutality of
the American police. The tough cop always creates the gangster.
This factor has been very effective in pushing normal workers
into professional delinquency."
"On American philosophy. Study the position of Josiah
Royce in the frame of the American view of life. What imp or·
tance and what function has Hegelianism had in this view? Can
Marxism expand in America and surpass empiricism.pragma.
tism without a phase of Hegelianism?"
This last is a most astonishingly penetrating insight. The reader
will be well advised to read Gramsci slowly and to ruminate on
what he has to say in the light of current arguments on socialism,
communism, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, and so on. His
paragraphs are packed with meaning.
Gramsci was a Marxist theorist, that is, a theorist active in the
society of his time. He had nothing in common with those intel·
lectuals who believe themselves arbiters of history and consider
it their mission to put, as Gramsci wittily said, "diapers on the
world." He was in and of the class struggle. He was an intellectually sober and emotionally passionate activist, a devoted political
leader of the working class, acutely conscious of the demands of
the time. He knew that Italy was at a turning point of its history;
either the working class moved forward to the assumption of
power or reaction would win in the most violent and brutal
manner. He wrote in 1920:
"The actual phase of the class struggle in Italy is the phase
which precedes one of two alternatives: either the working class
conquers political power, opening the way to new modes of
production and diSh"ibution that will permit a renewal of
productivity; or an enormous reactionary victory of the propertied class will take place. No violence will be overlooked
II

to subdue the industrial and agricultural workers and to subject them to servile labor: they will try to smash inexorably and
irretrievably the organs of political struggle of the working
class (the Socialist Party) and they will seek to incorporate the
organs of economic struggle, the unions and the cooperatives,
in the machine of the bourgeois state."
This was written before the Italian ruling class had fully
formulated its program in the nascent Fascist Party. The insight
of Gramsci was to be dreadfully vindicated in the terrible suffering of the Italian people in the two decades that culminated in the
catastrophe of World Wat II.
They were terrible times, and Gramsd was conscious of his
responsibilities, conscious too of the sharpness of the struggle, the
need for hardness and he had an explicit awareness of the psychological toll involved, the resulting cruelty and a degree of dehumanization. There is an anecdote of Lenin listening to music
and coming out muttering that p.e mustn't go again because it is
too affecting and makes for "softness" and that it is no time for
softness or the rabid bourgeoisie will destroy everything. A similar
incident is recorded by Gramsci in one of his letters. He writes of
his fight with an old, beloved professor:
"In November, 1920, I wrote against Professor Cosmo a
violent and cruel article such as can only get written at a
critical moment in the political struggle ... our cordial personal relations of teacher and ex-student were broken."
He goes on to write a moving tribute:
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"I conserve of Professor Cosmo a memory full of affection and
I would say of veneration were it not that this word does not
adequately express my feelings. He was, and I believe him still
to be, a man of great sincerity and moral stature, with many
streaks of that native ingenuity (originality) which is often a
characteristic of great erudite scholars."
A sensitive man, Gramsci, a great man, strengthened by the tens
of thousands of fellow-workers whose tenacity, loyalty, and selfsacrifice he recorded for the future:
I2

"The Communist Party today is the only institution that can
seriously confront the various Christian churches ... the Communist is certainly not inferior to the Christian of the catacombs. On the contrary. The ineffable end which Christianity
promised its champions was a sufficient justification for heroism, for martyrdom, for sanctity. For those who believe in a
heavenly reward and eternal beatitude, the great human forces
of will and character do not need to come into full play.
"But look at the Communist worker. Week after week, month
after month, year after year, after eight dehumanizing hours at
the machine, he goes on disinterestedly to give eight hours to
his party, his union, his cooperative. In the history of mankind,
he is a much greater man than the slave or the artisan who defied
all dangers to go to the clandestine prayer meeting. Likewise
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht are greater individuals
than the great saints of Christ."
The tribute that Gramsci pays to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht is fully applicable to himself. Consider this man, for
ten years in Mussolini's jails. Even in the most humane prisons,
the physical and psychological pressures of imprisonment are a
terrible ordeal; what must it have been like in a fascist jail? Add
the burden of pain and fatigue as tuberculosis ravages the organism; insomnia, hemmorhages, faintings, deliriums. In August,
1931, the most serious symptoms appear and by March, 1933, the
first complete physical breakdown. He recovers somewhat and
continues writing 'until 1935, when he can no longer work as the
disease burns the last remaining reserves of the body.
Watch him at work, day after day, fighting with the penal administration and with the government up to Mussolini himself
for the right to get a few books, a few magazines. Denied any
Marxist writings, he has to quote from memory, paraphrase, use
in his study of 6roce only what Croce gives of Marx, in other
words make his argument on Croce's own grounds. He has to
think of the censorship, avoid the well-known words and names,
so he develops a code: Marxism is called the philosophy of praxis
(from the Greek, to do; practice); Marx is called the founder of
the philosophy of praxis and Engels the second founder; Lenin
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is the greatest modern theorist of praxis; Capital becomes the
critique of political economy, and so on.
Yet he continues writing; an assiduous, incredible labor. How
the greatness of humanity is reaffirmed by the tenacity of his will,
particularly in the last few years as he writes with wasted body,
death a hovering companion. The enormous effort is reflected in
the physical act of writing. The first notebooks were neat, in a
clear and regular calligraphy. At the end, the handwriting wavers,
wanders, is erratic and weak. But the thinking remains lucid,
vigorous, trenchant, while the style continues poised and professional, spiced with humor, irony, and a genial twist of phrase.
Protest grew in Europe and his release was sought by the most
eminent men of the time, including such diverse figures as Romain
Rolland and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Mussolini was forced
to transfer Gramsci to hospitals in Formia and Rome. But it was
too late. Gramsci died on April 27, 1937. He died as fascist troops
and Nazi squadrons poured into Spain. Nazism and fascism
marched arrogantly forward, everywhere triumphant. Yet eight
years later, as spring came again to Italy, the carcass of Mussolini
hung by its heels at a gas station in Milan.
Gramsci's thought remains, and Gramsci's example.
CARL
New York City
October I5, I957
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Translator' s Note
Gramsci's last volume appeared in 1954 and by the following
year Cameron Associates had considered a translation. For various
reasons the work was postponed until recently leg injuries forced
the translator into bed and he began to work. Soon after, it became known that a volume of Gramsci's selected works would
be brought out by International Publishers, so the translator
stopped.
Nevertheless the material already translated, mostly the philosophic notes, was so interesting and many points so relevant to
American problems th~t it seemed useful to edit it and publish
it. The reader should remember constantly that these are notes
written in jail, with the facts often taken from memory, the
formulations unpolished, the contents of unequal importance. In
a real sense, this is Gramsci thinking out loud.
The translator has felt no compunction in removing a few
footnotes and a few paragraphs of esoteric references which
would be meaningless to the American public. Some paragraphs
were cut as repetitious, some terminology rephrased for better
comprehension, and coded expressions, like praxis for Marxism,
were "decoded."
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Preliminaries to a Study of Philosophy
We must eliminate the widespread prejudice that philosophy
is extremely difficult because it is the product of professional
intellectuals. We must show people that "all men are philoso·
phers," that every single human being has a "spontaneous phi.
losophy" whose characteristics can be studied. This philosophy,
which no one can avoid, is contained:
1. In language itself, for words are not only grammatical tools
and symbols-they embody as well an ensemble of notions and
concepts;
2. In common sense, and what we may call "good sense," that
aspect of common sense which most relies on causality;
3. In the popular religions and in the entire systems of superstitions, beliefs, opinions, ways of thinking and acting covered by
the term "folklore."
Ed. Note: Gramsci is intensely interested in what and how
the mass of the people thinks. He takes for granted that how
people earn their living is important; he takes for granted
that it influences their thinking., but he wants to know actually how they think and what . they think. He therefore
sketches a line of attack for a study of their mentality.
This approach is of some interest to Americans who wish
to engage in p'oliticsJ since there cannot be any political strategy or any political activity that will amount to anything if it
isn't based) inter alia, on a knowledge of the mentality of the
class enemy, one's own class, and its allies. As an example
of analysis of middle classes see Whyte, The Organization
Man, Simon &- Schuster, I956, and as a modest approach to
working class thinkingJ Swados' essay, uThe Myth of the
Happy Worker," The Nation, Aug. I7, I957.
We establish then that everyone is, at the least, an "unconscious" philosopher since the language itself contains elements
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of some world view. Now we move on to a second level, the level
of consciousness and criticism, and we pose this question: Is it
better to "think" in a disjointed and sporadic manner, through
ideas imposed by the environment, or is it better to think critically,
examining and rejecting ideas through the conscious activity of
one's own brain?
Since every person is a member of some social grouping, the
first alternative means that elements of a world view typical of
that group are imposed on the individual. That social group can
be as large as .one's own village or province or it can be as narrow
as a single "wise" patriarch or local Hwitch" with magic powers.
The imposed ideas may have originated in the "intellectual
activity" of the parish priest or that of a local petty intellectual
pickled in his own stupidity.
In the second alternative, conscious critical examination and
acceptance of one's own world view mean that the individual's
own brain chooses his sphere of activity; consciously participates
in world history, and becomes as it were a guide to his own selfdevelopment.
Several observations are germane to the above discussion. As
we have said, one always belongs to some social group, and precisely to that group where people share substantially the same way
of thinking and working. One is always a conformist in some conformism, one is always as it were a "collective man," a person
within a social group. The question therefore is to determine or
ascertain the historical character of that conformism, of that social
group. If a person's world view is not coherent but disjointed and
sporadic, then one develops a bizarre and capricious personality.
Such a personality will have within it elements of the caveman
alongside the most modern scientific concepts, remnants of parochial prejudices from past historical epochs, as well as intuitions
of a rising philosophy suitable to the entire human species, united
throughout the world.
To criticize one's own world view, therefore, means to make it
coherent and unified, and to develop it to the point reached by
the most progressive thought anywhere in the world. Such critique
I7

demands the criticism of any past philosophy that has left its
mark in the popular mind and in the popular philosophy. The
accumulation of remnants of past philosophies in contemporary
popular thought is enormous, yet an inventory must be attempted.
Above all, it is clear that the beginning of a critique of one's own
world view entails a consciousness of one's own self. You must
"Know thyself," but know thyself as the product of a historical
process.
Ed. Note: Here again it seems clear that Gramsci has put
his finger on a problem of our times. In Marxist circles selfcriticism has too often been taken to mean discussion of what
caused some specific error~ or, at a slightly deeper level~ the
examination and castigation of such superficial characteristics as vanity~ rudeness~ laziness~ etc. Gramsci will have
nothing to do with this. He demands that a Marxist study himself~ understand himself as the product of an entire historical
process. Thus American Marxists might more easily find
within themselves large elements of pragmatism~ male supremacy, chauvinism~ facile optimism~ and so on, which are
endemic in our society. Perhaps such an examination might
show to many that their Marxist world view was not as co.herent as they believed; perhaps even that it was not there.
Might not the result be a quality of tolerance~ an awareness
of fallibility without paralysis of the will?
It is impossible to study the content of a philosophy or culture
without studying its history. One cannot have a critically coherent world view without knowing its historical development,
its connections and conflicts with other world views.
A coherent world view is related to actual problems posed by
reality. It is stultifying to think about the concrete present by
modes of thought developed in the past to deal with quite different problems, particularly if those problems are completely
out of date. Such "anachronistic" thinking cannot make for a
unified personality. In social groups where such thinking is prevalent, the most developed modern ideas will go hand in hand with
the most backward social positions. The result is to prevent the
historical autonomy of that group.
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Here is a further thought on language in relation to philosophy.
If it is true that every language contains elements of a given
world view, then it follows that from any language the complexity
of the world view implicit in it can be deduced. The person who
speaks only a dialect or understands imperfectly his national
tongue will necessarily have a more restricted world view-parochial, fossilized, anachronistic-as cempared to the great currents of thought prevalent in the world. His interests will be
extremely narrow, tied to his most immediate economic problems.
While it is not always possible to learn foreign languages in order
to be in touch with other cultures, it is at least necessary to know
well one's own language. A great culture may be translated into
the language of another great culture since they are both rich and
complex and capable of worldwide expression. A dialect obviously
cannot do this.
Ed. Note: Gramsci is thinking here p'rimarily of Italy,
where substantial portions of the population are still speaking dialects which are incomprehensible to the rest of the
population. In some areas even comparatively close villages
cannot understand each other's dialects. Obviously the ignorance is enormous and the difficulties of teaching history,
economics, etc., are appalling.
But Gramsci's thought has an insight of value into American problems. While our national language is extremely
widespread and dialects are not a major problem (though
they do exist), and while education is widespread, yet the
leveling down of language in the popular press and comic
books, and the erosion of intellectual standards in the schools,
are resulting in a population which, slowly but perceptibly,
is being placed in intellectual blinkers. Coupled with the pervasive pragmatism of our culture, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to teach and understand Marxism. It is also the reason for the paucity of first-rate Marxist intellectuals in our
country.
One more observation. A new culture is created not only by
individual "original" discoveries, but also by the wide propagation of those truths which have already been discovered. These

truths must be "socialized" as it were, so they can give rise to
actions and be woven into the growing structure of a new moral
and intellectual order. That large groups of people should be led
to think coherently about their present problems is a much more
important "philosophic" fact than the discovery of a new truth
which remains the property of a small group of intellectuals.

•

•

•

The relation of common sense and religion to philosophy. A
philosophy is an intellectual, coherent system. Neither religion
nor common sense (the two do not coincide, for religion is an element of common sense) ... can constitute an intellectual system
because neither can be made unified and coherent even within
the individual consciousness, let alone collective consciousness.
In the past and within limits, coherence and unity were forced
"authoritatively" in religion, never by the "free" play of the mind.
Sociologically, the problem of religion is to achieve unity between a world view and a controlling standard of behavior. Such
unity can, however, be called an ideology, or directly "politics"
as well as religion.
Philosophy in general does not exist; what exists are different
philosophies, world views, and one always chooses among specific
philosophies. How is this choice made? Is it explicit, conscious,
purely intellectual, or is the choice made in a vague, much more
complex way? Haven't we often seen, for example, a contradiction
between an individual's intellectual concepts and his acts, his
standard of behavior? Which, then, should we say is his real world
view: that which he asserts logically or that which he shows implicit in his actions? Furthermore, human action is always a social action, it is a "political" action. Can't we say therefore that
a person's philosophy is always wholly contained in his politics?
The coexistence of two world views, often contradictory, one
expressed in words and the other shown through actions, is not
always due to bad faith. Bad faith may be a true and satisfactory
explanation for single individuals or even small groups, but it
is neither true nor satisfactory as an explanation when this con20

tradiction is found in large numbers of people. Then this contradiction must be the expression of deeper contradictions at a
historical and sociological level.
Ed. Note: This passage has a poignant relevance for American p·rogressives. Too many uMarxists" jump automatically
to conclusions of bad faith on the part of fellow-progressives,
workers and allies of the professional and middle classes
whenever they see contradictions between words and deeds.
This udevil theory" of history creates political havoc among
friends and allies, but it has equally disastrous consequences
even in dealing with the class enemy. Contradictions may be
due to bad faith, but it isn't always so and only the most concrete analysis of a concrete situation will show which is which.
In another connection later on, Gramsci shows that deterministic thinking does not allow for the possibility of Uerror"
on the part of the ruling class. The ((devil theory," itself a
deterministic concept, does not allow for Uerrors" arising out
of the complexities of ideology.

Such contradictions reflect the following: A social class has its
own world view but not as yet consciously. This world view is
shown only in action, when the class moves as an organic whole,
and since this happens only sporadically the world view is manifested sporadically. This is one reason why the class is not yet
conscious of its own world view. However, because of social and
intellectual subordination, this class borrows a world view from
another class and asserts this borrowed world view in words
although in action a con tradictory world view is manifested.
It must be remembered that this subordinate class does believe
in the borrowed world view because' it does follow it in action
in "normal times," that is, when the class is subordinated, divided,
and does not act as an organic whole. This discussion shows that
we cannot divide philosophy from politics, and in fact the choice
and the, critique of a world view are a political act.
Ed. Note: The imposition and fostering of a pragmatic
philosophy on the population (including the workers) in
England and America are a good example of a uborrowed"
2I

world view. It is against this phenomenon that we must consider the current widespread accusations that the American
working class is becoming corrupt and ((middle class' in its
attitude. The fact is that in "normal" times7 times of not
too great economic and social stress7 the working class is always "middle class" in ideology. It is in times of stress that
the working class moves autonomously, not according to its
((borrowed" ideas but according to its needs.
We must understand how at any time there exist many systems
and currents of philosophy, how they are born, how they are
propagated and diffused, why the propagation follows certain
directions~ splits and breaks up along certain "fracture" lines,
etc. We must systematize coherently our own thought and intuition of the world and do so critically rather than pedantically.
Such an elaboration can be made only within the framework of
the history of philosophy, which shows how thought has developed
over the centuries and what a great collective effort has been
necessary to achieve our present way of thinking. Contemporary
thought summarizes all our past history, including . errorS' and
hallucinations. Even errors which were made in the past, and
corrected at that time, can and do reproduce themselves today
and must be corrected anew.
The popular ideas on philosophy may be sought in the idioms
of popular language. For example, the idea implicit in the phrase
"to take things philosophically.'~ When examined, this idea is
not to be lightly dismissed. It is true that it contains an appeal
to resignation and patience, and is often used to that end. Yet,
more important, it would seem to me, is the appeal to reflection
and to the examination of things. The idea is implied that reason
is effective, that what happens is ultimately rational. Rational
events can be :faced and dealt with by concentrating one's own
rational forces and not letting oneself be dragged along by instinctive impulses.
Popular writers use similar expressions and idioms and whenever the word "philosophy" or "philosophically" is used there
is always the connotation of a concept of necessity which goes
.2.2

beyond bestial and elementary passions. Such is the healthy nucleus in common sense, what we may term "good sense," which
merits development to become unified and coherent. Thus it
seems to me that it is not possible to separate what is called "scientific philosophy" from that "vulgar philosophy" which is only
a disjointed aggregate of ideas and opinions.
This point, the continuum from common sense to the highest
philosophy, poses the fundamental problem of all world views
which have penetrated an entire society, namely, how to maintain
the ideological unity throughout the social body from the most
ignorant to the most sophisticated. It has been the strength of all
religions, and particularly of the Catholic Church, that they have
recognized the necessity of doctrinal unity throughout the entire
community, and have fought against the separation of higher
intellectual strata from the lower ones.
The Catholic Church has struggled tenaciously to prevent the
formal development of two religions, one for the "intellectuals"
and one for the "simple souls." This struggle has seriously inconvenienced the Catholic Church, particularly as the long-range
trend in modern culture is to undermine and corrode all religions.
In resisting this trend, the clergy has shown a noteworthy organizational ability, especially in the field of culture. Within its own
milieus the Catholic Church has stabilized the relations between
the intellectuals and the average people. The Jesuits have been
the major architects of this equilibrium. They have given the
Church a certain progressive orientation to keep abreast of scientific and philosophic developments but with a rhythm so slow
and methodic that the mass of the faithful do not perceive the
changes. At the same time, these changes are real and offend the
die-hard Catholics.

Ed. Note: An excellent recent example of this strategy of the
Catholic Church is the encyclical on evolution. The Church
could no longer deny evolution without seriously crippling
Catholic scientists and the science departments of its universities. The Church therefore has giver its official approval to
evolution-but only up to Adam and Eve! From Adam and
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Eve all humanity has descended. Thus the local priest can
tell the faithful that we are all descended from Adam and
Eve, implicitly rejecting evolution (of course we're not descended from monkeys!) while evolution is taught at Notre
Dame. This kind of thing infuriates the die-hard Catholic
Church in Spain and pleases the opportunistic Church in
the U.S.A.
One of the major weaknesses of immanent philosophies· has
been precisely their inability to forge an ideological unity between the intellectuals and the people. In the history of Western
civilization this has been exemplified by the failure of the Renaissance to attract the masses of the people and in part also by
the failure of the Reformation in attracting Catholic intellectuals.
Another example of the weakness of immanent philosophies
is shown in education. Not one such philosophy has been able to
develop a system of philosophical education which could compete with religion in the eclucation of children. The result is
that nonreligious pedagogues (most of them atheists) have conceded the teaching of religion by default. There has even developed a pseudo-historical justification for this: the sophism
that since religion is the philosophy of the childhood of man, it
has to be repeated in each contemporary childhood.
Idealist philosophy in general has shown itself indifferent to
cultural movements of "going to the people." Such movements
could succeed only if there were a unity between intellectuals
and the people such as should exist between theory and practice.
If intellectuals are organically of the people, they can develop
and make coherent those problems and principles which the
people are setting forth in their practical activity. Then a political and social unity would be constituted.
This is only a restatement of the fundamental problem of the
• Ed. Note: Immanent is the opposite of transcendental. Immanent philosophies are based on men's minds and/or the material world. Transcendental philosophies are based on God. Most Christian sects are transcendental; materialist philosophies are immanent. Idealist philosophies can be
either. I would consider Berkeley a transcendentalist and Kant an immanent
philosopher even though Kant to avoid solipsism was forced to bring in
God at the end of his inquiry to underwrite his philosophic system.

unity of a philosophical system throughout the social group. A
philosophical movement can be a specialized culture for restricted
groups of intellectuals or it can be a movement which never forgets to remain in contact with the people while at the same time developing a coherently scientific system superior to common sense.
In this very contact with the people such a philosophical movement finds the source of its problems. Only through such a contact
can a philosophy become historical, be cleansed of individual
idiosyncrasies, become "life."
It may be useful to probe a little deeper in the relation between
philosophy and common sense to understand the movement from
one level to another at any given time. In philosophy the characteristics of individual thought tend to predominate. In common
sense these characteristics are dispersed. You get the general
thought of a given epoch in a given popular environment. However, every philosophy is to some extent the common sense of a
group of intellectuals, however small.
We need to develop a philosophy which has the possibilities of
wide diffusion because it is implicit in practical activity, give it
the clarity and coherence of individual philosophies, and then
have it become a widespread "common sense" at a much
higher level. All this is impossible if one does not feel the necessity of maintaining contact with the people. Marxism should be
such a philosophy.
Ed. Note: The discussion of the rise of intellectuals from
the ranks of its peop'le is becoming relevant in the United
States to an ever increasing degree, particularly in the trade
unions. The CIO from the beginning was widely staffed by
intellectuals because of the combination of free publication,
education, substantial opportunities at the college levels, and
the depression which restricted avenues of emp'loyment.
Many of the unions were led by intellectuals, some formally
educated, others self-educated-Bridges, Carey, Selly, Relstein, the Reuther brothers, Emspak, Flaxner, Goldblatt, etc.
Today the process is continuing in the staffing of old-line
AFL unions as well. At the same time, however, by the pe-
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culiar quirk ot pragmatism on the American scene) all the
intellectuals in the labor movement would rather be caught
dead than admit it. Worse) most ot them turn their backs on
a systematic intellectualization of the secondary leadership
in their unions, looking to educating broader and broader
strata. Men like Bridges ot the Longshoremen, Gorman of
the Meatcutters) Emspak ot the Electrical Workers, Reuther
of the Auto Workers) are widely read) cultured men. Yet their
intellectual impact on their unions is minimal. Nor is this a
result ot political conservatism; left) center) and right op'erate
on an implicit) often explicit) basis of anti-intellectualism. A
different attitude is being built up in the U A Wand the UE
particularly) but the p'rocess is slow.
Let us now look at the philosophy of Marxism in the light of
this discussion. Marxism seems like a philosophy of intellectuals
separated from common people and from common sense. Since
Marxism supersedes previous philosophies and modes of thought,
it has at the beginning a polemical and critical stance and must
be a criticism of common sense. Yet, at the same time, from the
beginning, it also bases itself on common sense in showing that
every person is in fact a philosopher, that philosophy is not necessarily a narrow specialized science, and that Marxism in particular is not introducing a brand new science in every person's life
but rather wishes to develop, make conscious, and make critical
an already existing activity.
Marxism must be also a critique of individual philosophers
because philosophy has been developed through particularly
gifted individuals. ,Actually we can consider these individuals as
nodal points in the development of common sense, at least the
common sense of the cultivated strata of society and through
them to the popular common sense. Th.erefore a study of philosophy must show synthetically how problems arise in the development of a culture. That culture is only partly reflected in the
history of philosophy, yet in the absence of a history of common
sense (which can never be written for lack of data) the history of
philosophy remains the greatest source of study. Philosophy
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must criticize the old problems, show their current value, if any,
or their significance in the past as part of a chain, pose the new
current problems or the current validity of the old.
In Marxism, as in Catholicism, the unity between the "higher"
philosophy and common sense is assured by "politics." But the
difference between the two world views is enormous and fundamental. Marxism lifts up the people; Catholicism presses down
on the intellectuals. In Catholicism, whenever the development of
history separates the intellectuals from the people, the Church
cannot heal this rift by lifting the people to the level of the intellectuals. The Church doesn't even try to; economically and
ideologically the task is beyond her. The Church heals the break
by imposing an iron discipline on the intellectuals to prevent
an ideological differentiation which would be catastrophic and
irreparable by resulting in two religions. In the past such breaks
in the community of the faithful were healed by popular mass
movements which were brought into line within the Church by
strong personalities who created various religious orders-St.
Dominic, St. Francis, etc.·
The Counter-Reformation sterilized this upsurge of popular
forces within the Church. The Company of Jesus was the last
great religious order and was designed precisely to stifle popular
movements. Authoritarian and reactionary in origin, it has operated by repression and maneuver, "diplomacy." Its birth marked
the ossification of the Catholic organism. The new orders that
have appeared after the Jesuits have had little "religious" significance and a great deal of "disciplinary" significance. They
were either ramifications of the Jesuits, or have come under their
control, serving as political instruments rather than renovating
forces in a religious development. Catholicism has become
"Jesuitism." In modern times the Church has created no great
• The heretical movements of the Middle Ages based on the social conflicts
created by the rise of the towns were simultaneous reactions to the politics
of the Church and to Scholastic philosophy. They were often hemmed in by
the popular religious movements and taken back into the Church through
the formation of Mendicant Orders and a new religious unity.

religious orders, but rather a political party, Christian Democracy.·
The position of Marxism is the opposite of the Catholic position. Marxism does not try to keep the people within the confines
of their primitive philosophies. It leads them from common sense
to a higher view of life. Marxism insists on the necessity of contact
between the intellectuals and the masses of people not in order
to limit scientific activity and achieve unity at a low level, but
rather to build an intellectual bloc which will make politically
possible the higher intellectual development of the people.

Ed. Note: After the revelations and upheavals in the Socialist world, the ideas of Gramsci on the contrast between
Catholicism and Marxism seem nai've. Many observers would
argue that there is no essential difference between the two,
that both imp'ose an iron discipline on intellectuals and both
stifle the spirit of inquiry and the spirit of artistic and scientific freedom. Many progressives in America have accepted this view and are profoundly disoriented. Many ask
whether socialism is not by its nature totalitarian.
Yet a closer analysis of Soviet development, including its
dark and somber areas, shows a great correspondence to
Gramsci's analysis. The enormous educational achievements
of the U.S.S.R. designed to lift an entire p'opulation from
the cultural level of the Middle Ages to that of the Twentieth
Century are beyond dispute. The Soviet Union today has one
of the finest public educational systems in the world in terms
of coverage of population, lack of discrimination, educational standards, social status of teachers, and so on. Their
scientists are among the best and Professor E. Teller, the
"father" of the H-Bomb, after a recent visit to the U.S.S.R.,
stated flatly that in a decade their science would lead the
world. Fortune Magazine of February, I957, acknowledging
• Wickham Steed in his Memoirs tells the anecdote of a Cardinal explaining
to a pro·Catholic English Protestant that the miracles of Saint Gennaro
(patron saint of Naples) are articles of faith for the Neapolitan populace but
not for Catholic intellectuals. Whereupon the Protestant asks, "But aren't
you all Catholic Christians?" And the Cardinal answers, "I am a 'prelate'
which means an office-holder, a 'politician' of the Church of Rome."
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the world leadership of Soviet scientists in many areas, attributed it to the freedom of Soviet scientists in contrast to
other areas of Soviet life so that the brilliant students
gravitated to science. All this in forty years. Whereas after
2,1)00 years the Catholic Church is still one of the most powerful world-wide forces for intellectual backwardness of the
people. Where the Church is strongest (Spain, prewar
Hungary and Poland, Slovakia, etc.) there education of the
people is at its lowest.
Isn't it possible that the very education of the Soviet
population, transforming the country psychologically as the
industrialization has transformed it physically, is one of the
root causes of the present evolution of Soviet politics, at
home and abroad'!

The average man acts practically to achieve certain ends. To
the extent that he is successful he has to some degree shaped the
world around him-his activity has changed the world. But his
success is in direct relation to his understanding of himself and
the world around him. Vice versa, his activity is a form of knowledge of the world around him in so far as he is changing it. Yet
the average man has no theoretical consciousness of this. In fact,
his theoretical consciousness may be, and often is, in contradiction to his actions; one may almost say that he has two theoretical
consciousnesses (or, perhaps, one contradictory consciousness).
One consciousness is implicit in his actions which are uniting him
with all his coworkers in the practical transformation of reality;
the other is the explicit consciousness, the verbal one, which he
has inherited from the past and which he has uncritically accepted. This "verbal" consciousness is also responsible for actions.
It is tied to a given social group which influences his ethical behavior, the direction and exercise of his will. The existence of
these two consciousnesses, this contradiction, may reach a point
that it prevents any action, any decision, any choice. It may create a state of moral and political passivity.
Critical understanding of one's own self takes place through a
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struggle of political "hegemonies,"· first in the field of ethics,
then in politics, to reach a higher understanding of reality. The
consciousness of belonging to a given hegemony is the first phase
of a further self-consciousness in which theory and practice are
finally united. Therefore even the unity of theory and practice
is not a mechanical given fact but a historical process. That is
why we have stressed that in political development the concept
of hegemony is a great philosophical step forward for mankind.
This concept includes and presupposes an intellectual unity and
an ethic which conforms to reality.
Ed. Note: The moral and political passivity of many progressives in the United States and elsewhere illustrates this
discussion 7 but with a reverse twist. That is, one can argue
that, among progressives, Marxism is the "verbal" conscious·
ness while the consciousness shown in acts is idealist, prag.
matist, or what have you. As a matter of fact, in many cases
both consciousnesses are becoming explicit. Ruling class
concepts are striving against Marxist concepts in the minds
of men. A good illustration is the discussion over ends and
means. The ruling class loves to ask, ((Does the end Justify
the means?" and all they are up to is to stop opponents before
they get well started. They set up absolutes like the Ten Com·
mandments and then try to prevent unions by calling the
leadership atheists, or break up a strike because someone
is killed or prevent socialism by saying that the means used
are evil, inhuman, etc. Meanwhile throughout history the
ruling classes have merrily gone on with wars, killing, force,
violence, breaking every rule they ever made, all quite
((legally" and ((officially."
Actually the dispute over ends and means is artificial. Only
the end can justify the means. Hegel says, what else can
justify the means except the end? The end to be achieved is
subject to ethical judgments; is it right or wrong, good or evil?
But the only valid question about means is: are they causally
• By "hegemony" Gramsci means moral leadership of a social group
through the sum total of its concepts, actions, and methods. He considers that
Lenin sharpened and developed this concept and gave it a concrete expression
in Bolshevism.
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correct} are they efficient, will they bring about the desired
result; are they necessary and sufficient?
In... the more recent developments of Marxism we are still at
the initial phase of deepening the concept of the unity of theory
and practice. Remnants of mechanism remain in ideas such as
theory as a "complement" to practice or as "ancillary" to practice.
This concept too can be looked at as an aspect of the political
problem of intellectuals.
The awareness of the unity of theory and practice is a historical development of critical self-consciousness. This entails the development of a "leading group" of intellectuals within the mass
of people. The mass of people cannot become independent and
autonomous without organizing itself, and organization is impossible without organizers and directors, without intellectuals.
A group within the mass must develop the theoretical concepts
necessary for development including most particularly the unity
of theory and practice . .
This process of developing a group of intellectuals is long and
difficult. It is full of contradictions, of advances and retreats, of
people coming together, disbanding, regrouping, and so on. In
this process the loyalty of the mass of people to its own intellectuals is sorely tested. And it should be noted that loyalty and
discipline are the form of the agreement of the people with the
intellectuals, and the form of their collaboration in the developing historical process.
"Leadership" develops within the people dialectically. As the
group of leaders develops intellectually quantitatively and qualitatively it is inextricably connected with the people. Every leap
forward of the intellectuals toward a widening of their horizons
and toward greater complexities has a relation to the cultural
level of the people which also rises, via individuals and small
groupings, toward the level of the intellectuals.
Again and again, however, in this process, the intellectuals lose
contact with the people. There is a lag, a separation, and therefore
the impression arises, that theory is complementary to practice,
3I

that it is subordinate. At such times, to insist on the primacy of
"practice" is to show that the historical development is in a primitive phase where the production relations of a society are still
changing and an adequate superstructure has not fully developed.
Ed. Note: The discussion above may help to understand
one of the factors in the upheaval in Hungary~ the break between the leadership and the people. Production relations
were changing rapidly; the superstructure was not adequate.
To say that economic problems were serious in Hungary is
to beg the question: the proper contact between leadership
and people would have prevented the up'heaval~ as Poland
shows. It was the hypocrisy and arrogance of the leadership
which in part fueled the flames. This discussion illuminates
another observation of Gramsci quoted in the introduction:
ilin the phase of state power all the superstructure must be
developed~ or the state itself may disintegrate."

In further discussing the unity of theory and practice we should
take a look at political parties in the modern world. Political
parties develop and propagate the ethics and politics corresponding to specific world views. Their role in this context
is of the greatest significance. They function almost as "experimental laboratories" in the historical testing of world views. Individuals adhere to these parties so that the parties act as screening devices through which the mass of the people is divided among
various world views. This screening takes place both in the field
of practical activities and in the field of theory, separately and in
various mixtures. The more the specific world view is vitally
and radically new, the more it is antagonistic to older world views
the tighter is the relationship between theory and practice as
the screening takes place. It may be said that political parties are
the developers of new ideologies, that they are the crucibles
wherein takes place the unity of theory and practice on a historical
scale.
It should now be easy to understand why a working class party
should be formed through the adherence of individuals and not
through the unions. [Gramsci has in mind the British Labor

32

Party, which is composed in both ways.-Ed. Note] A party must
be composed of individuals who know what they are doing and
why if it is to direct organically the entire mass of the people.
Such direction cannot take place by old methods but by innovations in organizations and procedures, and innovations cannot become the property of the people except through the teaching of a leadership group. These leaders at all levels must have
some consciousness of the world view implicit in the people's
practical activity, must have some coherence in their thinking
and a will which is clear and committed.
Discussions of the concept of the unity of theory and practice
still suffer from the over-all vulgarization of Marxism. One can
still sense deterministic, fatalistic, mechanistic elements which
have created an "ideological aroma" around Marxism, making
it a kind of religion. We can see how this came about, and is even
historically justifiable, given the "subordinate" character of the
social groups which accepted Marxism.
When one does not have initiative in a struggle the struggle
becomes identified with a series of defeats. In such a situation
mechanical determinism becomes a formidable morale builder,
making for cohesion, patience, and obstinate perseverance. The
rationale is well known: "I have been defeated for the moment
but the logic of things works for me in the long run, etc." We
can understand and sympathize but the fact is that in such a view
the act of will becomes a travesty, becomes an act of faith in the
assured rationality of history. In form, it is nothing but an empirical and primitive type of passionate fatalism which seems
simply a substitute for similar concepts in religions like predestination, Providence, etc. It should, however, be observed that even
under such conditions the will is acting directly on the "logic of
things," but it is doing so implicitly, almost ashamed of itself, so
that the consciousness is veiled, contradictory, lacks critical impact,
etc.
But when the "subordinate" group becomes the ruling group
responsible for the economic activity of the people, then mechanistic Marxism becomes at some point a clear and present danger.
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Ed. Note: This is perhaps the most prophetic insight of
Gramsci, as the events of Poland and Hungary have shown.
This sentence written thirty years ago has the immediacy of
current events. Wrong ideas always do harm, but wrong ideas
plus power can be catastrophic.
When such a group rules it is imperative that it change its
mode of thinking because life itself has changed. The "logic of
things" is no longer absolute; it has limits and restrictions. Why?
Because it can be acted upon. If the "subordinate group" felt
itself yesterday a plaything of outside forces, this ruling group
today has power and initiative; yesterday it was irresponsible,
today it is active and independent. But even this formulation is
wrong, for is it ever true that even yesterday it was an irresponsible plaything? Certainly not. Fatalism is the weak.1ing's garb
for a real will. Hence we must always show the futility of a mechanistic determinism. We can understand it as a naive philosophy
for the average man, and, as philosophy, an element of strength
for him. But if it is accepted by intellectuals as a coherent and
critical philosophy, then it leads to passivity and a kind of imbecilic self-sufficiency, whether the intellectuals are subordinate
or ruling. We must always remember that within the people,
however downtrodden, there are elements which are responsible
and developing and that their philosophy anticipates the future
not only theoretically but in their daily activities.
The proof that a mechanistic conception is the philosophy of
subordinate groups is shown by an analysis of Christianity. Under
given historical conditions Christianity is a "necessity" for the
mass€s, giving them a means of expression, a rationality of the
world, a framework for practical activity. This function seems
well phrased in an article in Civilta Cattolica ("Pagan Individualism and Christian Individualism," March 5, 1932):
"Faith in a secure future, in the immortality of the soul
destined to Paradise, the certainty of being able to reach eternal
happiness, all this was the mainspring of a drive for internal
perfection and spiritual development. True Christian individualism found here the impulse to its victories. All the strength
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of a Christian was gathered around this noble end. Freed from
speculative waverings which disarm the soul with doubts, and
guided by immortal principles, man felt his hopes resurgent.
Certain that in his struggle against evil a greater power sustained him, man surpassed himself and won the world."
Of course, this refers to primitive Christianity, not the jesuitized religion which has become a narcotic for the people.
Even clearer and more significant for our argument is the position of Calvinism with its iron concept of predestination and
grace which determined a vast expansion of individual initiative.
We move on to another aspect of philosophy: how and why are
new world views widely pr~pagated and popularized. This process of propagation of the new is at the same time a substitution
for, and often a combination with, the old. Various factors feed
this process: the form in which the new world view is taught, the
recognized authority of the teacher and of the thinkers who support him, the kind of people who belong to the organization
which supports the new world view (even those who joined for
other motives than the acceptance of the new world view). All
these ~lements vary according to the social group and its cultural
level.
But the research in which we are most interested is the research
on these factors within the broad population. The people change
concepts with great difficulty, and never by accepting new concepts in their "pure" form, so to speak, but always in some eclectic
·combination. Rationality, logical coherence, completeness of
argumentation, all these are important but far from decisive in
dealing with the people. Of course, it can be decisive at a secondary level, if the person involved is already in a state of intellectual crisis, has lost faith in the old, and is wavering between
the old and the new.

Ed .. Note: A pregnant analysis that seems tailor-made for
American progressives who do have a tendency to assume that
Urationality, logical coherence, completeness of argumenta-
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tion" are decisive in propaganda. Lincoln and Roosevelt
knew better. So did a Lenin~ or~ in our own back yard, a
Marcantonio. They knew, and consciously too~ that in dealing with large groups of people the new ideas they
presented would be absorbed unevenly~ in highly personal
mixtures with other ideas and interpretations. They gave
here and there~ seeking the largest areas of agreement~ and so
were accused of opportunism and compromises. Yet they held
to their course, successful political leaders. The Eisenhowers
and the Nixons have no such problems, for they are not introducing new ideas. They manipulate the stereotypes of old, embedded in the popular mind, and can thus find easily wide
areas of agreement with the people.
The same may be said of the authority of thinkers and scientists,
which is generally very great among the people. But every world
view can cite thinkers on its behalf, so that their authority is
divided. Moreover, every thinker has a tendency to refine and
qualify, to cast doubt on what he has said by his way of saying it.
We may conclude therefore that the propagation of new concepts takes place for political, ultimately social, reasons, and that
logic, authority, and organization are very important only as soon
as a general reorientation has· taken place in the individual or in
the group. From this we conclude that in the people at this stage,
philosophy can be lived only as a faith.
After all, consider for a moment the intellectual position of the
average person. He has been shaped by opinions, convictions,
some criteria of discrimination, and certain rules of behavior.
Any ideological opponent who is intellectually superior can argue
his position better than our man can, defeat him logically, and so
on. What should our man do, change his convictions because he
can't win the given discussion? But then he might be changing his
opinions once a day if he should happen to meet superior opponents. This he cannot do, and he won't do. Therefore what is
the basis of the philosophy of the average man, and especially
of his ethics? Undoubtedly the most important element is not
reason but faith. But faith in whom and in what? Faith in that
social group to which he belongs and who think as vaguely as he
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does; the average man feels that so many people cannot be as
wrong as his argumentative opponent would like him to believe.
It is true, thinks our man, he himself is not capable of winning the
argument, but there is someone in his own group who can, and
in fact our man remembers hearing such a coherent impressive
argument for his beliefs that he was, and has remained, convinced.
He may not remember the argument concretely, and he couldn't
repeat it, but he knows it was true because he heard it and was
convinced. The permanent reason for the permanence of a conviction is to have been strikingly convinced once.
Ed. Note: This fine analysis of how new ideas spread out
among the people is of great relevance to the American progressive movement. After a decade of reaction many progressives are disheartened. The power of propaganda of the ruling class seems so enormous (newpapers~ comic books~ radio,
TV~ movies~ large sectors and elements of schools and colleges) that its sheer weight is sometimes paralyzing. But its
power is deceptive. Years and years of falsification are swept
aside at one stroke when a single experience teaches a person
the truth, particularly (though not necessarily) if someone
is at hand to focus the meaning of that experience for the person concerned.
The truth has to break through but once; the lies of the ruling class have to be constantly reiterated. Again and again,
a bitterly anti-union man becomes pro-union in a struggle~
and generally speaking this change is definitive; once a union
man, always a union man.
The ruling class in their propaganda are like the Red
Queen: they must run and run to stay in the same place. Nay,
they are constantly losing ground. Since the birth of Marxism, over a hundred years ago, Marxism has steadily spread
among the people from generation to generation, in every
country and corner of the world including the West. It is a
thought to keep in mind in bad times.
We conclude that there is an extreme instability in the new
convictions of the people, particularly if these convictions contradict the orthodox convictions that conform to the interests of the
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dominant class. We see this, thinking over the vicissitudes of religions and of churches. A given church maintains its community
of faithful to the extent that it maintains its basic faith in an
organized manner, indefatigably reiterating its apologetics,
fighting at any and all times, using always the same arguments,
and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who dignify the faith
with at least a semblance of thought. Every time the relations
between the church and the faithful have been violently interrupted for political reasons, as in the French Revolution, the
losses to the church have been incalculable. If the difficulties in
carrying out habitual rituals had continued, it is conce.i vable that
the losses would have been decisive and that .a new religion would
have arisen. In a sense this did happen in France with a mixture
of new ideas and the ancient Catholicism.
We deduce certain musts for any cultural movement which
seeks to supplant old world views:
1. To repeat unceasingly and tirelessly one's own arguments,
though, of course, varying the literary form. Repetition is the
most efficient didactic method of working on the popular mind.
2. To work incessantly to raise the intellectual level of ever
greater strata of the population. This entails developing groups
of intellectuals of a new type, who rise directly from the people
yet remain in contact with them, forming as it were the "ribs"
corseting the mass.
If this second condition is fulfilled, the uideological panorama"
of an epoch is truly changed. The development of groups of
individuals entails an organization within themselves, a hierarchy
of intellectual competence and authority. This hierarchy may
culminate in a great individual philosopher if he can relive concretely the ideological needs of the people, if he understands that
this ideology cannot have that elegance and subtlety appropriate
to an individual brain, and must therefore develop formally a
collective doctrine suitable to the ways of thinking of a co~lective
man.
It should be quite apparent that a basic conceptual change in
the people cannot take place "arbitrarily" around any ideology
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whatever as a consequence of the will of a strong personality or
of a group who just wants to do it because of the fanaticism of its
own convictions. The adherence or nonadherence of the people
to an ideology is precisely the test which reveals the reality of a
new concept, its rationality and its historical validity. "Arbitrary"
systems may reach a degree of popularity because of favorable
circumstances, but they are invariably eliminated in this historical competition. Concepts and systems which correspond to the
complex necessities of an organic historical period always prevail in the end, even though they may have to go through intermediate phases during which their acceptance takes place in
heterogeneous combinations and formulations.
The unfolding of the movement whereby a new world view is
accepted by the masses presents many problems. The fundamental one which we have mentioned is the relationship between the intellectuals and the people. More specifically, the problem lies in the function of the higher intellectual groups. On
one hand their own intellectual development must be safeguarded; on the other hand they must bring creative support to
the lower intellectual groups and the masses of people, bearing
in mind their capacities for discussion and development of new
concepts. It is a question basically of setting the limits of freedom
of discussion and propaganda, a freedom which must be understood not in the context of police methods, but in the context of
self-discipline and self-control which the leadership places upon
itself.
Ed. Note: Here we come to the great problem which is agitating all the socialist countries of the world~ a problem which
life itself poses and not this or that bureaucracy, as many
people think. The character of a bureaucracy is primarily the
result and not the cause of the way this problem is resolved,
though, of course, one affects the other.
Weare speaking, in effect, of laying down the "line" in culture
and politics. Let us look at the problem this way: who will determine the "rights of science" and the limits of scientific research?
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In fact, can these rights and these limits be determined at all? I
think not. It seems to me that of necessity the search for new
truths, and for clearer, more coherent formulations of these truths
must be left to the free initiative of the individual scientists-even
if scientists continually re-examine those very premises which seem
most essential, fundamental, and settled once and for all.

Ed. Note: Gramsci, the Marxist philosopher in the great
Marxist tradition, unequivocally asserts the necessity-necessity, not desirability-of free scientific inquiry. The scientist
himself must be the judge of his own freedom. When
Gramsci speaks of science he includes Marxism. His last
sentence serves both to rivet his philosophic position and to
hint that this creates problems for the statesman. Since
Gramsci was an active political leader, he is fully aware of
these p·roblems. Therefore, having spoken as a philosopher,
he continues the analysis as a political leader.
Of course, it is not too difficult to c~ari£y and expose those
"scientific initiatives" which have ulterior motives and are not
the result of disinterested scientific inquiry. In addition, while the
thought is free, it is not impossible to consider that the results do
not have to be publicized. Individual initiatives may be disciplined
by passing through the sieve of academies, cultural institutes of
various kinds, and so on. Only after such examination can they become public.

Ed. Note: This is not a jesuitical argument, taking back
with the left hand what he gave with the right. Gramsci is
wrestling with .a p'r oblem which is insoluble in principle at ·
our level of civilization, the conflict between innovation and
stability; the conflict between the needs of the individual
and the needs of the group; the conflict between the rfJ,inority
and the majority in a society. The role of the political leader
and of political science is to reconcile, make things viable.
Politics is the art of the possible. Note the word art}' not science; the individual plays an important role. This is what
Gramsci is doing.
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We would offer the so-called American Dilemma as an example, the p'r oblem of race prejudice in the South. It is insoluble under conditions of capitalism. It can be ameliorated
by a combination of laws, force, education, the pressure of
social approval and disapproval of the rest of the country.
Negroes will go to school, Negroes will get the vote, but racial
prejudice will not disappear. It will take a considerable period
of socialism until racism will completely disappear, that is, be
completely eliminated from the consciousness of human
beings just as totemism has disappeared from the consciousness of modern man. In our stage of society in the United
States the best a functioning political leader can do is to remove the legal disabilities against Negroes and stop the use
of force and violence against Negroes in the South.
As an aid to studying the relationships between philosophy and
the people, it would be of great interest to examine concretely, for
a single country, the cultural organization which keeps the ideological world in motion. It would be useful to examine its practical day-to-day operations. It would be useful also to study the
numerical relations between the professional personnel engaged
in cultural work and the population of a given country, together
with an estimate of the nonprofessional people so engaged.
Schools at all levels and churches are the two major cultural
organizations in any country in view of the number of people
working in them. Newspapers, magazines, libraries are next as
well as private scholastic institutions. Certain professions include
in their specialized activities a substantial amount of cultural
work, for example, doctors, army officers, judges.
It must be noted, however, that in all countries, to a varying
degree, there is a gap between the masses of people and the intellectual groups, even those closer to the people in great numbers,
like priests and teachers. This is so because, no matter what the
rulers say, the state does not have a coherent unifying role, so
that various intellectual groups are disjointed from level to level
of the population. The universities, for example, except in a very
few countries, play no unifying role, so that often a single inde-

pendent thinker has more influence than the entire institution
of universities.
Finally, a few words on the historical role of fatalism within
Marxism. We should, I think, prepare a funeral elegy on the concept of fatalism, praising its usefulness in a certain historical
period but burying it once for all-with full honors. Fatalism
can be compared to the theories of grace and predestination at the
beginnings of the modern world which finally culminated with
the classical German philosophy and its concept of freedom as the
recognition of necessity. The concept of fatalism was a popular
substitute for the medieval cry "God will it," although even at
this primitive level of causality it was a more modern and fruitful
concept. It is possible that a new concept might be born in a different "formal" manner than the rough and uncouth form which
the people shape. Nevertheless the historian with his perspectives
can point out that the beginnings of a new world, always stony
and bitter, are superior to the decline of a dying world and its
swan songs.

Base and Superstructure
Economics and ideology. We must fight theoretically as primitive infantilism the attempt to explain every fluctuation of politics
and ideology as an immediate reflection of some change in the
economic base of the structure. This nonsense is sometimes even
presented as an axiom of historical materialism. In practice we
can fight this idea with the authentic testimony of Marx, whose
political and historical works are always concrete. See particularly
the Eighteenth Brumaire, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in
Germany., Civil War in France., etc. An analysis of these writings
will help to see clearly Marxist historical methodology, by integrating, interpreting, and illumin~ting the various theoretical
propositions scattered throughout all these volumes.
One can see how many warnings Marx introduces in his concrete researches, warnings which would have no place in his
theoretical, generalized writings. An;lOng these warnings we may
list the following:
1. The difficulty in identifying at any given time the economic
base of a society as if it were static. Politics is, of course, at any
moment the reflection of unfolding tendencies in the economic
base, tendencies, however, which may not come to fruition; nor
can they be analyzed in process. The point is that any phase in the
development of the economic base can be studied concretely only
after its development has been finished. During the process of
development the phase can be studied only through hypothesis,
by suppositions, and we must be clear that's what we are doing.
[Italics added-Ed.]
2. It follows from this that any specific political act may have
been an error on the part of the administrators of the ruling
classes, an error which historical development rectifies through
the parliamentary "crisis" in the governments of the ruling classes.

Mechanistic historical materialism does not consider the possibility of error, but assumes that every political act is determined by
the economic base of society, that it is a reflection of some real
change in the base. The concept of "error" is a complex one: it
may be an individual error or it may be an indication of attempts
at control by factions within the ruling class, attempts which may
or may not fail.
3. We don't pay enough attention to the fact that many political actions are due to internal organizational necessities, the needs
to maintain the coherence of a party, a group, a society. The history of the Catholic Church is full of examples. If every ideological struggle within the Church had to be explained by a change
in the base of society, a student would go crazy. (I must say many
political-economic "dime novels" have been written this way.)
Most of the ideological arguments were related to organizational
needs. For example, take the struggle between Rome and
Byzantium on the derivation of the Holy Ghost. It would be
ridiculous to seek in the economic base of Eastern Europe the
reason for the assertion that the Holy Ghost derives only from the
Father, and likewise in Western Europe for the assertion that the
Holy Ghost derives from the Father and the Son. The existence
and conflicts of the two Churches do depend on their economic
base and on their historical developments, but the specifk positions on the Holy Ghost were set forth as an area of differentiation
by the two Churches to strengthen their internal cohesion. They
could have changed positions and it wouldn't have mattered so
long as the conflict was maintained. This is the real historical
problem to be analyzed and not the casuistry on each side.
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What Is Man
What is man? This is the first and principal question in philosophy. If we think about it we see that when we ask what man is,
we are really asking what man can become) that is, can man dominate his own destiny, can he "remake himself," can he create his
own life? We answer, therefore, that man is a process, the process
of his activities.
The very question, what is man, is not an abstract question.
It arises from our introspection, our thinking about ourselves and
about others. We want to know what we are to know what we can
be; we want to know within what limits, if any, we can "forge ourselves." And we want to know this "today," that is, in the conditions of contemporary life.
The content of this question is already shaped by given ways
of considering life and mankind. The most important of these
existing ways is religion, and particularly one religion, Catholicism. In reality when we ask, what is man, how important is his
will, etc., we are asking: "Is Catholicism a correct view of life and
man? Are we in error or are we right in being Catholics, in making
this religion our way of life?" Now everyone has a vague intuition
that he is making a mistake in adhering to Catholicism as a way
of life and, in fact, no one does it, although he still calls himself
Catholic. A real integrated Catholic, one who would apply
Catholic rules to every act of his life, would be a monster. When
one thinks about it, this is the most severe criticism that could
be made of Catholicism, and the most inescapable.
Ed. Note: These last two sentences have been given life in
the novel The Ecstasy of Owen Muir by Ring Lardner Jr.
Owen Muir is a convert to Catholicism who seeks to apply
the rules of his religion to every act of his life. The resulting
contradictions not only give great scope to Mr. Lardner's
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superlative satire, but they show inexorably that rigorous
adherance to Catholic dogma does turn a man into a monster."
Since Italy is a Catholic country, Gramsci's knowledge and
awareness of Catholicism are part of his life both theoretically
and as a political leader. But much of what he has to say is
applicable to the United States. This country is the major
financial and political stronghold of the Catholic International, and the Vatican is a much underestimated factor in
world politics. Domestically, too, the American Catholic
hierarchy, in its philosophy, organizational outlook, educational powers, and consciousness in daily activities, is one of
the most important components of reaction at every level,
municipal, state, and federal. American Marxists have shied
away from the problem of Catholicism both in theoretical
and in practical activities, primarily because of the fallacious
view that it would be divisive to pay too much attention to it.
The Ecstasy of Owen Muir was criticized for this reason.
Admittedly the problem is difficult, but it is not insoluble.
It calls for political skill and knowledge; concrete examination and concrete solutions. But one thing is certain: nothing
is ever gained by leaving the field to the enemy.
U

In rebutta1, Catholics will argue that no other world view is
faithfully followed in action. This argument is true, but all it
shows is that historically there is no other way of thinking which
applies equally to all men. That is all this argument proves and
there is nothing in it favorable to Catholicism. The contrary is
the case when one considers that this way of life has been organized for centuries with the aim of having men conform to its
dogma and that no other religion has operated with the continuity, the means, the centralization, the power, and the systematic
exposition of its dogma as the Catholic Church.
What makes for dissatisfaction in Catholicism from a "philosophical" point of view is that it places evil within man as an individual. [Adam arid original sin-Ed.] Man, therefore, is
a well defined, and limited, individual. All religions hitherto existing, in one way or another, have basically the same position as

Catholicism. All conceive man as an individual prisoner of himself, limited by his own individuality, his mind and soul so
limited. It is this concept of man which must be changed. [Italics
added-Ed.] We must conceive of individual man as a series of
active relationships, a process, in which his individuality is not
the only element to be considered, though it is of the greatest
importance.
Humanity, mankind, as reflected in each individual is composed of three elements: (1) the individual, (2) other individuals,
(3) nature. Elements two and three are not as simple as they seem.
The individual's relations with other men are not merely based
on juxtaposition, just being next to one another. These relations
are organic, they take place only to the extent that the individual
is part of social organisms, from the simplest to the most complex.
Likewise man does not enter into relationships with nature by the
mere fact that he is himself a part of nature. He deals with nature
actively and organically, through his labor and his technics. But
there is more. These relationships are not mechanical. They are
active, conscious, and self-conscious to the degree that the individual man is aware of them.
It may be said therefore that each person changes himself to the
extent that he changes and modifies the entire complex of relationships which center in him. FrQm this aspect the real philosopher is the political person, the active man who modifies his
environment, the sum total of his relations. If one's own individuality is the totality of his relationships, the consciousness of
self, the personality, is the awareness of the totality. To change
one's own personality means to change this totality.

Ed. Note: This most penetrating analysis of personality
illuminates the proposition that the Marxist "know thyself"
is a social~ active concept rather than a static, contemplative
phenomenon of individual introspection. As mentioned elsewhere in these notes, the analysis is extremely relevant to the
problem of self-criticism and concretely, in the United States
as elsewhere, to the problem of raising the caliber of Marxist
thought.
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These relationships, as we have said, are not simple. Some are
necessary, others voluntary. Furthermore, to be conscious of them
is already to change them in some degree. Necessary relationships
change in importance, appearance, and significance to the extent
that their necessity is recognized. In this sense, knowledge is
power. But the problem is furth~r complicated. It isn't enough
to understand the totality of relationships at a given moment, as
a given system, but we must understand it genetically, understand
how the system and the relationships were formed. Every individual is not only the synthesis of contemporary relationships, he
is also a summary of the entire past. It may be objected that
what each individual can change is very little. This is true up to a
point. But since each person can join others who want the same
changes he can multiply himself an imposing number of times. If
the change desired is "rational/' historically possible, then even a
very radical change can be achieved, one that did not seem possible
at first sight.
The social groups which an individual can join are extremely
numerous, much more so than one would think. Through these
groups and groupings an individual becomes part of the human
species. Likewise numerous are the ways in which an individual
deals with nature, because by technics we must understand not
only scientific ideas applied industrially, but also such "mental"
instruments as philosophic knowledge.
Man cannot be conceived of except as living in a society. This
is a commonplace, but all the consequences have not been studied.... We must develop a doctrine wherein all the relationships
are active and in motion, keeping clearly in mind that the control
center of this activity is the individual self-consciousness of the
individual human being who knows, desires, admires, creates
only to the extent that he knows, desires, admires, creates, etc.
Provided that th~ individual is always conceived not as isolated,
but one full of the possibilities offered to him by other men and
by nature.

Marxism and Modern Culture
Marxism has been a nodal point in the development of modern
culture. In varying degrees it has determined or influenced many
philosophic currents, but this significant fact has been generally
ignored by "orthodox" students of Marxism. Probably the reason
for this neglect is that the most significant philosophic amalgams
have been those between Marxism and idealism, amalgams which
struck orthodox students as reactionary or downright fraudulent.
Hitherto, Marxism has been subjected to a double revisionism.
On one hand some of its elements were incorporated, implicitly or
explicitly, into certain idealist positions-Croce, Gentile, Sorel,
Bergson and pragmatism. One current even went back to Kant, as
for example the work of Professor Adler of Vienna and in Italy
Professors Poggi and Baratono.
On the other hand, the "orthodox" students, narrowly understanding Marxism as a "simple" interpretation of history, tried
tq strengthen it by identifying it with a philosophy which was
basically a traditional materialism. In general, blends of Marxism
with idealism have been attempted by what we may term "pure"
intellectuals, whereas the "orthodox" view was developed by more
active intellectuals whose activities put them in touch, to some
degree, with sections of the people. This contact, it should be
added, did not prevent many of these intellectuals from making
somersaults of considerable political, and historical, importance.
The distinction between "pure" and "active" intellectuals has
considerable significance. The first tended to be leaders in their
respective countries, architects of the ideologies of the ruling
classes. They used elements of Marxism to strengthen their ideologies, particularly to tone down the speculative elements in their
philosophies. Their purpose was to forge new and better weapons
for their own social class.
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The "active" intellectuals, on the other hand, were in many
cases fighting for progress and trying to combat the most reactionary ideology among the people, namely, transcendental religion.
They tried to utilize in their struggle an opposing ideology already widespread among the people, namely, crude materialism.
Such materialism is a large component of common sense, as well
as of superstition and witchcraft which are fostered by religion
among the ignorant. As a result, the tendency of orthodox Marxism was to fall into the trap of a vulgar materialism.
Ed. Note: The most important of these ruling class philosophers who have used Marxist concepts to develop better
ideological weapons has undoubtedly been Bergson with his
pragmatism, which in America was spread by Professors
Royce and James. Gramsci, as he mentions above and reiterates below, considers pragmatism the philosophy most
in debt to Marxism. We are in no position to evaluate this
judgment of Gramsci; we would venture that pragmatism's
emphasis on action as a test of truth seems to owe a good
deal to the Marxist emphasis on practice (the unity of theory
and practice). However, as Gramsci says, this subject requires
much study.
What is incontestable, however, is the importance of such
study, for p'r agmatism has been and is the major ideological
weapon of the American ruling classes and its penetration in
Marxist ranks has been the greater because the less realized.
Against all these approaches, Antonio Labriola affirms (though
not always consistently) the proposition that Marxism is an independent and original philosophy, self-contained, autonomous,
and capable of further development. Entirely from its own inner
resources, Marxism can develop further not only in the interpretation of history but as a world philosophy of the widest application.· We must follow Labriola's path.
• "Labriola, Antonio, 1843-1904. Italian socialist ph osopher. Professor
at the University of Rome from 1874 until his death. Was under the influence
of Hegel, Hebart, and Marx respectively. . . . As the first professor of
philosophy in a European university to expound historical materialism,
Labriola raised the prestige of revolutionary socialism in intellectual circles."Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
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Ed. Note: This proposition of Antonio Labriola is fundamental to Gramsci's thought. Gramsci argues that since Marx
and Engels there has been a deterioration in the study and
application of Marxism primarily because Marxists have not
'fully realized the strength of Marxism as a completely autonomous philosophy. Marxism will develop not by marrying
Marx to Freud; to Jesus} to logical positivism} or to what have
you} but by se-rious; sobetr study of reality in the light of dialectical materialism. The need} to put it crudely} is to take
Marxism seriously} rather than dogmatically. Dogmatism is
the opposite of taking Marxism seriously. It uses Marxism not
as a theory and a tool to examine reality} but rather as a source
of authoritarian quotations -to support opportunistic ideas.

It is illuminating to find out why Marxism ~as been used by
both idealists and materialists. How could such contrasting philosophies find elements in Marxism which were of value to them?
Research on this question requires analytical finesse and intellectual sobriety. Studies must be made with great critical caution to
identify those concepts which Marxism has Hgiven" to traditional
philosophies, thereby rejuvenating them for a time. Such studies,
in a sense, would amount to a history of modern culture since
Marx and Engels.
It is not difficult to trace explicit borrowings of Marxist concepts. A classic example is Croce's reduction of Marxism to a set
of empirical rules for historical research. Croce's concept has
penetrated even into Catholic circles (see the work of Monsignor
Olgiati) and has helped to create that Italian school of history
known as the economic-juridical school.
More difficult, however, is the research on the unavowed, implioit borrowings from Marxism, due to the fact that this philosophy, because it was a nodal point in modern culture, has become
part of a general climate of opinion and has modified modes of
old thought in subtle and hidden ways. In Sorel and his development, for example, . one can find many clues to hidden Marxist
concepts. The same is true of Croce. The most important example,
5I

however, is that of Bergson and pragmatism. A careful study
would show, we believe, that many of the concepts of pragmatism
would be inconceivable without the historical link of Marxism.
Another facet of this question of Marxist influence is seen in
political science. Just as the Jesuits fight Machiavelli theoretically
and at the same time are his best disciples, so opponents of Marxism reject it bitterly in words while in practice they accept Marx's
political analysis. For example, when Mario MissiroIi was Rome
correspondent of the Stampa he wrote in a column (around 1925)
that the more intelligent industrialists believed in their heart of
hearts that Das Kapital had some deep insights into their world
and were using these insights for their own purposes. This, of
course, is not surprising. If Marx has in fact analyzed capitalism
correctly this simply means that he has systematized coherently
what the historical agents of capitalism feel vaguely and intuitively. After Marxism, these agents become more clearly aware of
their role, more self-conscious.
Ed. Note: What was surmised thirty years ago is unquestionably true today. Secretary of Defense Forrestal~ of unhappy fame, hired a professor to make him a study of
Marxism. The European ruling classes have for years studied
Marxism in their great universities, often under well-known
Marxists as teachers. In part this is due to the fact that as the
U.S.S.R. grew in power ruling groups wished to understand
their enemy, yet in part it is also the result of the value of
Marxism as a philosophy and its pressure on all areas Of
knowledge.
This phenomenon should give pause to many American
progressives who are ready to jettison Marxism because it is
((out of date/' particularly those who do so under a rationalization of ascertaining "what is still valid today." While there
is no question whatever that Marxism must always be concretely applied to any historical period or situation, and in
that sense its lIvalidity" is constantly tested~ the premise of this
activity is the knowledge of Marxist thought. Serious~ sustained MarXiist study in a context of high critical standards,
by people who are committed and are active in the world

52

around them, is a minimum prerequisite for a revitalized
Marxist movement in America.

Let us return to our earlier and more interesting discussion:
why did orthodox students combine Marxism with traditional
materialism rather than with other philosophies equally current?
Relevant to this question is the essay of Rosa Luxemburg, Stillstand und Fortschritt im Marxismus (Vorwarts, March 14, 1903),
which notes that various elements of Marxism have been developed in varying degrees but always according to the requirements
of practical work. She argues that Marx and Engels had been so
in advance of their generation, and the following one, that their
ideological weapons could not be used because few were able to
use them. With the passing of time, these weapons are now useful
and should be refurbished. To some extent this explanation is
logically circular, nevertheless it has an element of truth which
should be developed. As we have previously mentioned, Marxism
allied itself with other philosophic tendencies in order to fight
the remnants of pre-capitalist ideologies within the masses of the
people, religion in particular.
Marxism had two tasks: on one hand to combat modern ideologies in their subtlest forms in order to. build its own group of
intellectuals, and on the other hand to educate the masses of
people whose culture was practically medieval. Given the character of Marxism, this second task seemed fundamental. As a result
it absorbed all the energies of Marxism, quantitatively and qualitatively. For propaganda purposes Marxism was combined with
a form of culture somewhat superior to the popular average (which,
of course, was extremely low) and by so doing became absolutely
inadequate to combat the ideologies of the cultured classes. All
this despite the fact that Marxism was born to supersede classic
German philosophy, the highest cultural manifestation of the
period.
Ed. Note: Rosa Luxemburg'S idea is a thought-provoking
one and so is Gramsci's, but it should be remembered that
Gramsci is speaking from a background Of Catholicism. In
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the United States, while religion is a powerful ideological
weapon of reaction, it is not nearly so powerful as in Catholic
countries, and there is less cause for Marxism to be vulgarized.
We should study whether the kind of cultural "deployment"
we have outlined is not a historical necessity and whether in past
history we couldn't find similarities in other cultural developments. To me the claSSIC example in recent times has been the
Renaissance in Italy and the Reformation in Protestant countries.
Croce has something to contribute on this. On page 11, History
of the Baroque in Italy, he writes:
"The movement of the Renaissance remained aristocratic,
within elite circles. Even in Italy, which was its mother and
nurse, the Renaissance never left the Court circles, never penetrated to the people, never became 'custom and prejudice,' a
collective belief and faith. The Reformation, on the other
hand, 'did have the efficacy of popularization but paid for it
with a slowing up of its inner development,' that is, with the
interrupted maturing of its vital germ."
On page 8 Croce writes,
"Luther, like the humanists, deplores sadness and praises
happiness, condemns idleness and commends labor, yet at the
same time shows such a hostility to literature and studies that
Erasmus could say ubicumque regnat lutheranismus ibi litterarum est interitus [and wherever Lutheranism rules, there literature is buried]. Whether or not" continues Croce, "this aversion
of Luther's was solely responsible, the fact is that German Protestantism for some two centuries was sterile of studies, critiques, or philosophies."

Ed. Note: Here in passing is an idea which has great value
today, as large sections of the world's population are in transition from an old form of society to a new form. It takes a
long period, sometimes measured in centuries, for new ways
of thought to be assimilated by the people, and for new
groups of intellectuals and artists to be formed so completely
imbued with the new world view that art comes to fruition
in presenting that world view.
The upholders of the old can sneer, always and easily, at
the lack of culture in the new society and point with pride to
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the existing culture~ still being produced by the old. This~ of
course~ is what has gone on for years in regard to Soviet literature~ painting~ architecture~ and~ to a lesser extent~ Soviet
music. But the socialist world won't take two centuries to
come into fruition. Already~ in science? the first breakthroughs
are taking place~ and large intellectual groups have been
shaped.
Erasmus~ who sneers at Lutheranism~ was a liberal Catholic~ and as much against the abuses of the Church as Martin
Luther. He was a man of great stature in the Catholic world
of his day~ yet he and others like him ucrooked the pregnant
hinges of their knees" before the threat of excommunication
and the fear of being burned at the stake. Valiant in their
sneers~ they were pliant in their actions.
Calvinism also, with its harsh conception of grace, did not favor
free research. What happened to Calvinism, however, is that in
the process of interpreting and adapting the concept of grace to
that of a vocation (a calling) it ended up by forcefully promoting
economic production and the accumulation of wealth.
The Lutheran Reformation and Calvinism gave rise to vast
national-popular movements, in which the ideologies became
widely diffused, and a superior culture was created only in much
later periods. This immediate popular diffusion within the Protestant countries enabled them to withstand tenaciously and victoriously the crusade of Catholic armies. Thus was born the
Gennan nation, one of the more vigorous countries in modern
Europe.
France was lacerated by religious wars which ended with a
seeming victory for Catholicism. But in the 1700'S there began to
take place a great popular reform, with the Enlightenment, the
spread of the spirit of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, a reform
which preceded and accompanied the Revolution of 1789. This
huge intellectual and moral reform of the French people was even
more complete than that of Luther in Germany because it involved the great peasant masses, because it had a pronounced lay
basis, and because it tried to substitute for religion the completely
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nonreligious ideologies of nationalism and patriotism. N evertheless, not even this reform resulted in an immediate flowering of
high culture except in political science with the development of
law.
Marxism can be conceived of as a modern popular reformation. . . . It presupposes our entire cultural past, Renaissance
and Reformation, German philosophy and French revolution,
Calvinism and English economy, lay liberalism and that sense
of history which is the root of all modem conceptions of life.
Marxism is the crowning achievement of this entire movement
of intellectual and moral reform, dialectically realized in the
contradiction between popular culture and high culture. Marxism corresponds to the nexus of the Protestant Reformation and
the French Revolution: it is a philosophy which is also a politics,
and a politics which is also a philosophy.
Marxism is still going ,through its popular phase. To develop
a group of independent intellectuals is not easy. It is a long process of actions and reactions, adhesions, desertions, dissolutions,
new and many groupings and regroupings of a complex character.
Marxism is the world view of an oppressed social class which has
had no historical initiative. This class has grown continually
larger without ever being able to pass a certain qualitative point:
the lack of state power. The full organic development of an
intellectual group can take place only through the real exercise
of authority in a society. Yes, Marxism has itself become "prejudice" and "superstition," a popularized aspect of modern history, but Marxism has within itself the potential to surpass this
popularization.
One final point at this time. In studying the history of cultural
developments we must pay special attention to how cultures are
organized and to the personnel of those cultures. In a volume of
G. di Ruggiero, Renaissance and Reformation we can see what
was the attitude of most intellectuals of that time, headed by
Erasmas. They bent before the persecutions and the burnings.
It was the German people who carried on the Reformation. The
desertion of the intellectuals before the enemy helps to explain
J
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the sterility of the Reformation in the realm of advanced culture.
Time was needed while a new group of intellectuals slowly
emerged from the people, to carryon the work that culminated
in classical German philosophy.
Something similar has happened so far to Marxism. The great
intellectuals who became Marxists were not only very few but
they were not tied to the people, they weren't of the people. Generally they were the products of intermediate classes to which
they returned at times of great historical upheavals. Others who
remained carried on a systematic revision of Marxism instead of
furthering its autonomous development. We assert that Marxism,
although a nodal point in world history, is nevertheless a new concept, original and independent. We thereby also assert the independence of a new culture now incubating which will develop
with the development of social relations.
What exists from time to time is a varying combination of the
old and the new, a momentary equilibrium of cultural relations
corresponding to the equilibrium of social relations. Only after
the creation of a new state does the cultural problem impinge on
society in its entire complexity. Before the formation of a state
Marxism has to be critical-polemical, and, while it should never
be dogmatic, it cannot help a somewhat romantic stance. But it
is a romanticism which consciously aspires to a serene classicism.
Marxism not only claims to explain and justify the past, it
claims to explain and justify itself. It claims the greatest degree
of historical perspective, utter freedom from any abstract ideology,
the real conquest of the historical world, the opening of a new
civilization.
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Brief Notes
Scientific Discussion. We must not conceive of a scientific discussion as if it were a courtroom proceeding in which there are a
defendant and a prosecutor who, by duty of his office, must show
the defendant guilty. It is a premise of scientific discussion that the
interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement of
science. Therefore the most "advanced" thinker is he who understands that his adversary may express a truth which should be
incorporated in his own ideas, even if in a minor way. To understand and evaluate realistically the position and reasons of one's
adversary (and sometimes the adversary is the entire thought of
the past) means to have freed oneself from the prison of ideologies,
in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has then arrived at a critical
frame of mind, the only fruitful stance in scientific research.
(Italics added.-Ed.)
Marxism and English classical economy. In a certain sense, one
may say that Marxism is Hegel plus Ricardo. Let us pose the
problem: are the new methodological concepts introduced by
Ricardo in the science of economics to be considered merely
as tools, or do they have significance as philosophical innovations? Is the formal logical principle of the "law of tendency"
which enables one to define scientifically the fundamental concepts of economics and of the "determined market" a discovery
with epistemological value? Does not this law imply a new concept
of "necessity," of freedom, etc.? It seems to me that Marxism has
universalized the discoveries of Ricardo, which are tied to the
birth of the science of economics. This is the point in the development of the bourgeoisie when it has become "concretely" a world
class, that is, that a world market is formed sufficiently "dense,"
full of complex movements sufficiently numerous so that within
them one may isolate laws of regularities, laws of tendencies. Naturally, these are not laws in a deterministic sense, but "historical"
laws through which is observed the "determined market," an organically living environment.

Translation of Philosophic
and Scientific Idioms
In 1921, while dealing with organizational questions, Lenin
wrote or (said) something like this: We have not learned to "translate" our language into the various European languages.
Ed. Note: The use of the word language is misleading, for
Lenin is not thinking primarily of the Russian tongue but
of Soviet ways of thinking, even Soviet ways of acting, both
deeply affected by the culture, history, and mores of past and
existing Russia. Today it is accepted that Soviet develop'm ent
has been affected, for good and evil, by the Russian past.
To avoid misunderstandingJ we are using the word
"idiom" to indicate the cultural ensemble, the ways of thinking and acting in a country at a given time. By corollary the
word "translate" me{lns to transpose, to find correspondence
or differentiations among the "idioms" of various countries,
or of different periods in the same country. For example, can
the French political revolution be compared with the German philosophical revolution?
There is a question whether the reciprocal translation of different scientific and philosophic idioms is a key element of all
world views including Marxism, or whether Marxism alone can
achieve such translation, while other world views can do so
partially or not at all.
Translation of idioms into one another presupposes that a
given period of civilization has "basically" an identical cultural
expression, even if the idioms of the nations in that civilization
are quite different, since they are each determined by a specific
national development, culture, philosophic systems, etc. There is
also a question whether a translation of idioms is possible between
different phases of a civilization which have developed one from
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the other and are thus, in a way, integrated. Finally, can any
existing idiom be translated in the idiom of a past phase of a
given civilization? This is particularly useful if the past phase is
more comprehensible than the present one and can thus serve to
illuminate it.
I believe that only in Marxism is such "translation" possible
in an organic manner, whereas in other world views this translation is often only a schematic game.
Ed. Note: Many historians have used the past to illuminate
the present and vice versa. Many have found or imposed correspondences between various periods of greater or lesser
validity. The most ambitious attempt in our times has been
that of Arnold Toynbee who has created a series of concepts
((withdrawal and return/' Uinternal pro Ie taria t/' Utime of
troubles/' etc., to ((translate" various periods in various civilizations. Toynbee's world view is a mysticalJ transcendental
Christianity essentially reactionary. Because of his enormous
erudition (perhaps unique in contemporary historiography),
his liberal position in English P'olitics, the urbane tone of his
writing as well as a reticence in expressing too often, and
too explicitly, his philosophy, Toynbee's reactionary character has not been sufficiently noticed. Life magazine, however, devoted an enormous amount of space to popularize as
much as possible the name of Mr. Toynbee and his concepts.
See the review on Toynbee by Paul Sweezy in The Nation,
Oct. I9, I946, reprinted in The Present as History, Monthly
Review Press, I953.
J

J

J

J

J

There is a passage in The Holy Family which says the French
political idiom of Proudhon corresponds to and may be translated into the idiom of German classical philosophy. The idea
is very important in understanding certain aspects of Marxism,
in finding a solution to seeming contradictions in history and in
answering certain superficial objections against historical materialism....
Let us see first if this critical principle has been approximated,
or confused, by others with analogous formulations. In the Sep-
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tember-October, 1930, issue of New Studies in Law, Economics
and Politics Luigi Einaudi writes an open letter to Rodolfo Benini

[two eminent economists of the period] and a note on page 303
says:

"I wish I had the faculty of my dear departed friend Vailanti
who could translate any theory from a geometric language to
an algebraic language, hedonism into Kantian ethics, pure
economics into applied economics. I would then translate a
page of Mr. Spirito into your formal language, classic economics. It would be a fruitful exercise similar to that described
by Loria who in his youth took an economic problem and presented it first in the language of Adam Smith, then Ricardo, then
Marx, Stuart Mill, and Cairnes. But such exercises can only
find their way into a drawer, as did Loria's. They are useful
only to teach us humility whenever we think we have found
something truly new. Because if this novelty can be presented
in the language of our ancients, and be framed in their thought,
then it can't be so completely new. However, each generation
can and should use the language which better suits it to understand the world. History is constantly rewritten, why shouldn't
economics be rewr,i tten, first in terms of cost of production, then
utility, then static equilibriums, then dynamic equilibriums?"
This methodological note of Einaudi is very limited and refers to the idioms of scientific personalities rather than to idioms
of national cultures.... However, it does seem like a first small
approximation to the more profound and larger problem posed
in The Holy Family.
Often two scientists, both shaped fundamentally by the same
civilization, believe that they are developing different "truths"
because they are using different scientific languages. Similarly
two national cultures, shaped by the same civilization, consider
themselves different, opposite, an.tagonistic, each superior to the
other only because they used different idioms shaped by differing
tradition and activities peculiar to each culture: a political-juridical idiom in France while in Germany the idiom is philosophic,
theoretic, and doctrinaire.
For the historian these two cultures can be reciprocally translated. This "translation" may n6t be exact, of course, even in
6I

important particulars. (But what tongue is perfectly translatable?
What single word can be exactly rendered in another tongue?)
The important point, however, is that they are basically similar .
. . . The observation in The Holy Family that the French political
idiom is equivalent to the idiom of classic German philosophy
was expressed "poetically" by the Italian poet Carducci:
"A King lost his head to Robespierre,
Kant send God reeling through the air."
In creating this poetic junction between the practical politics
of Maximilian Robespierre and the speculative thinking of
Emmanuel Kant, Carducci borrowed this idea from Heine. But
the juxtaposition of Robespierre and Kant is not original with
Heine. Croce writes that he found a fugitive mention of it in a
letter from Hegel to Schelling (July 21, 1795), and it was then developed in Hegel's lessons on the history of philosophy and the
philosophy of history. In Lessons on the History of Philosophy Hegel says that "the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and
Schelling contains, in the form of thought, a revolution" which
has gone forward in Germany and in which "only two peoples have
participated, the German and the French, however opposite they
are one to the other, in fact just because they are opposite." However, whereas the new principle "erupted in Germany as a spirit
and as a concept/' in France it was demonstrated as "effective
reality."
In Lessons in the Philosophy of History Hegel explains that
the idea of the formal will, of abstract liberty, by which "the
simple unity of self-consciousness, the I, is the absolute independent liberty and the source of all universal determinations," "remained among the Germans as a tranquil theory whereas the
French willed to execute it practically." . . . This passage of
Hegel seems very important as the "source" of the idea expressed
in the Theses on Feuerbach that "the philosophers have explained
the world and the problem now is to change it." Philosophy
must become politics to be true, to continue to be philosophy:
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"tranquil theory" must be "executed practically," must become
"effective reality." This passage of Hegel may also be taken as
the source of Engels' statement that the German working class
is the heir of German classical philosophy. Finally this passage
may be considered an element in the development of the theory
of the unity of theory and practice ....

Ed. Note: This idea of ((translation" of national cultures
is interesting but seems at first glance not too useful~ except
at the low level given by Einaudi of converting one terminology into another. For example~ Marxist concepts can be
translated into cap'italist concepts: the Marxist concept of
surplus value is equivalent to the capitalist concepts of profits), interest~ capital investment~ etc. The ability to effect this
translation is important in the field of research because
capitalist statistics are governed by capitalist concepts. It is
also important in the field of propaganda to get Marxist
ideas accepted by people with capitalist concepts in their
heads.
However~ as Gramsci says~ this is a first approximation. At a
higher level it means to go below surface similarities or differences to find the more important relations. The statism of
the Nazis~ for example~ and the statism of the New Deal had
many points of similarity including economic measures that
derived from Keynes in both cases. But in Germany the statism stifled the people and wrecked German capitalism (it was
only rescued by the p'resence of the U.S. Army in the
postwar period and by massive infusions of American capital
buying into German industry), while in the New Deal statism
gave a strong spin to the freedoms of the American people
and stabilized American capitalism.
At the level of languages themselves, let us examine the question
of metaphors. A well known Marxist metaphor is the traditional
one that the "anatomy" of a society is constituted by its "economy."
This metaphor came out of the discussions in natural sciences and
the classification of animal species, a classification which became
"scientific" when it started to be based on anatomy and not on
secondary characteristics. Furthermore, this metaphor was justi-

lied by its "popularity," that is, it was easily understood by a not
too intellectual public. (Few ever take into account the fact that
Marxism, which wishes to develop morally and intellectually
those social groups which are culturally backward, often has
recourse to metaphors which are terribly vulgarized.)
The linguistic origin of a metaphor for a new concept helps
to understand that concept by showing how it emerged in a given
cultural world. At the same time it clarifies the limitations of the
metaphor so that it should not be used mechanically. In a given
epoch, the experimental sciences served as a kind of "model."
Since the social sciences, like history and economics, sought an
objective foundation which would give them the same stability
as the natural sciences, it is easy to understand why the social
sciences turned to the physical sciences in creating their own
terminologies. Incidentally, from this point of view, we should
differentiate between Marx and Engels, as each one's language
had different cultural origins and their metaphors reflect different interests.
Marx and Hegel. In the study of the Hegelianism of Marx we
must remember that he participated in the German university
life shortly after the death of Hegel, when the "oral" teaching
of Hegel must have been extremely vivid, and when there must
have been passioned discussions which Hegel's teaching certainly
stimulated, with references to concrete teachings, so that the historical concreteness of Hegel's thought must have been even
clearer than it is in his systematic writings. Certain sayings of
Marx seem to me to be especially related to this Hconversational"
vividness, for example, the saying that Hegel "makes man walk
with the head downwards." Hegel uses this very image in speaking of the French revolution. He writes that at a certain moment
of the French revolution it seemed "that the world was walking
on its head," or something like that. When Croce asks where Marx
got this image, I would say that I'm pretty sure that it is in a
book of Hegel (perhaps The Philosophy of Law), but it really
seems as if it flowed out of a conversation, so fresh it is, so spontaneous, so little Hbookish."

ABOUT ANTONIO GRAMSCI: From the Editor's INTRODUCTION
Antonio Gramsci is a name practically unknown in America, yet he is one
of the leading thinkers of the last half-century. An Italian Marxist, he died
in Mussolini's jails in 1937. When he was arrested in 1926 he was 35 years
old, married, with one child and another on the way whom he never saw. At
the time Gramsci was a Deputy to the Chamber (a Congressman) and secretary of the Communist Party of Italy.
After being moved from jail to jail he was finally transferred to a penitentiary in Bari in July, 1928. For the next six years, until his health completely broke down. Gramsci studied and wrote, filling thirty-two notebooks
with notes, observations, and essays. He wrote over a million words, which
made up six volumes when they were published between 1947 and 1954. States
a recent Italian encyclopedia: "The thirty-two notebooks written in prison
constitute a very important document of Italian culture. . . • His letters from
prison are outstanding as an expression of humanity as well as culture."
Gramsci is a Marxist of the caliber of the early Kautsky, and he compares
favorably with Plekhanov and Rosa Luxemburg. He is a Marxist in the great
tradition of Marx himself, a thinker with an open mind, disciplined in the
search for truth. The daily newspaper Ordine Nuo'Vo, which he edited, carried
on its masthead the motto "To Tell the Truth Is Revolutionary." Today, when
Marxists throughout the world know the consequences of a lack of probity
and sobriety in theory and practice, Gramsci's austere words are fresh and
invigorating:
.
"We must not conceive of a scientific discussion as if it were a courtroom
proceeding in which there are a defendant and a prosecutor who, by duty
of his office, must show the defendant guilty. It is a premise in scientific
discussion that the interest lies in the search for truth and the advancement
of science. Therefore the most 'advanced' thinker is he who understands
that his adversary may express a truth which should be incorporated in his
own ideas, even if in a minor way. To understand and evaluate realistically
the position and reasons of one's adversary (and sometimes the adversary
is the entire thought of the past) means to have freed oneself from the
prison of ideologies, in the sense of blind fanaticism. One has then arrived
at a critical frame of mind, the only fruitful stance in scientific research."
To speak of Gramsci as a Marxist with an open mind may strike many
people as a contradiction in terms, because the behavior of a considerable
number of Marxists has bolstered ruling class propaganda that Marxism is a
dogma. Marxism is not a dogma though there are Marxists who are dogmatists, just as science is not dogma though there are scientists who are
dogmatists. Marx himself made this point when he averred that he was no
"Marxist."
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